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Lawrence v Fen Tigers: where now for nuisance? 
 
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v Fen Tigers 1  is 
significant, not least for the fact that it is one of few recent decisions of the 
highest court in relation to the tort of nuisance. In addition to giving general 
guidance on the relationship between nuisance and planning and with 
regards to the appropriate remedy in nuisance cases, it discusses the potential 
for an easement to make noise.  
 
In many respects the decision can be said to be helpful and welcome. The 
clarification of the role of planning permission within nuisance actions is 
extremely useful. There are some questions raised by the decision however, 
and the indication that the judges would be willing to see a greater role for 
damages within nuisance is both significant, and from a property law 
perspective at least, potentially problematic. What the decision does not tell 
us however, despite the clear acknowledgment from the judiciary that the 
appeal raised the issue, is what the role of nuisance is and ought to be in an 
era of heavy regulatory control on the use of land.  
 
Facts 
 
The claimant’s house, in a rural location in Suffolk, was within approximately 
half a mile of a stadium at which there were regular motor races. The levels of 
noise emitted during the races were high – and the claimants brought an 
action in nuisance against the defendants. The defendants argued that the 
planning permission which they had been granted permitting such racing 
prevented a successful nuisance claim, as well as arguing that the longevity of 
their actions prevented C from bringing a claim at this point (either due to the 
acquisition of an easement by prescription, or because long user meant that 
the race track now formed part of the character of the locality). 
 
Decision 
 
The decision of the court can be divided into three key sections, albeit that not 
all members of the court agree on all issues. Firstly, the court was required to 
decide whether the claimants had acquired an easement to make noise. 
Secondly, the court was then required to assess whether, if no such easement 
had been acquired, the actions of the defendants constituted a nuisance to 
which they had no relevant defence. In order to answer this question the 
court needed to assess whether it could be argued that either the claimants 
having “come to” the nuisance, or the existence of planning permission in 
favour of the speedway track, could prevent a successful action in nuisance. 
Finally, if the court concluded both that there was no easement, and that there 
was a good claim in nuisance, they had to decide the appropriate remedy to 
grant.  
                                            
1 [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433. 
 
On the first question the court concluded, albeit obiter, that it was possible to 
have an easement to make noise. 2  Lord Neuberger conceptualised the 
easement of noise as an easement to transmit sound waves across another’s 
land. He acknowledged that an easement of noise is unusual, not least 
because of the high number of potential servient tenements.3 His Lordship 
also acknowledged that this easement had the potential to be extremely 
vague.4 Nevertheless, these issues were not seen to be a barrier to the right 
being capable of being an easement in theory. It is no surprise therefore that 
the court also concluded that it could be acquired by prescription.5 On the 
easement point therefore, although the reasoning of the court is obiter since 
they concluded on the facts that no such easement had in fact been acquired,6 
the possibility was accepted.7  
 
The court also concluded that the action constituted a nuisance, and that there 
was no valid defence upon which the defendant could rely. The first step in 
reaching this conclusion was to confirm that, as per Lords Neuberger and 
Carnwath, the test in nuisance is one of reasonable use, where “reasonable” is 
judged objectively, in the context of the character of the particular locality 
concerned.8 The court then went onto discuss the question of the claimant’s 
coming to a nuisance, confirming the long-standing line of lower authority 
case-law holding that there is no defence in the claimant “coming to” a 
nuisance.9 Per Lord Neuberger, “where the claimant in nuisance uses her 
property for essentially the same purpose as that for which is has been used 
by her predecessors since before the alleged nuisance started… defence of 
coming to the nuisance must fail”.10 The reasoning behind this conclusion is 
convincing. It makes little sense to conceive of nuisance as the property tort, 
but restrict action on a nuisance to the “first” owner to experience the 
problem.11 “The right to allege a nuisance should, as it were, run with the 
land”.12 Thus far the conclusions reached by the court are uncontroversial.  
 
From this point the reasoning of the court becomes more interesting. Leaving 
to one side for the moment the obiter comments relating to the possibility of a 
defence based on the claimant’s change of the use of their land,13 the next 
question related to the relevance of both the defendant’s on-going activity, 
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3 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [33]. 
4 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [33]. 
5 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [37]. 
6 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [143] and [145]. 
7 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [41]. 
8 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [3], [5] and [179]. 
9 Sturges v Bridgman 11 Ch D 852, Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966. 
10 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [51]. 
11 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [52]. 
12 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [52]. 
13 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [53] – [58]. 
and any planning permission, to the character of the locality. On the first 
point it was held that the defendant cannot rely on the very activity which it 
is alleged constitutes the nuisance as a defining feature of the character of the 
locality.14 To do so would mean that virtually no action could ever constitute 
a nuisance.15 On the second, the court held that planning permission for the 
act constitutive of the nuisance is not a defence to a nuisance action. 16 
Similarly, the fact of the planning permission for that action cannot change 
the character of the locality so that the action becomes acceptable.17 This, the 
court concluded, will be the case even where the planning permission 
constitutes a major or strategic development in an area.18 This point reverses 
some earlier case-law which had suggested that a major or strategic plan in an 
area would change the character of that locality so that any nuisance which 
arose as part of that change would not be actionable.19  
 
Finally, the court moved onto the question of remedies and held that 
although prima facie the remedy for nuisance is an injunction,20 there may be 
circumstances where damages are more appropriate. 21  Their lordships 
indicated, essentially, that lower courts should not be afraid to give damages 
in lieu of an injunction, although, as their lordships acknowledge, they did 
not agree completely on what the right approach should be. 22  The 
considerations that they indicated might be taken into account included 
public interest in the activity carried on by the defendant, both in terms of the 
viability of that business, and in terms of the public enjoyment of the activity, 
as well as the interests of people affected by the nuisance other than the 
claimant. 23  Discretion as to remedy is however, as the court highlighted, 
unfettered.24  
 
Comment 
 
There is much to be welcomed in this decision. The conclusion that it is 
possible to have an easement to make noise and the confirmation that 
planning permission cannot be a defence in relation to nuisance are, in this 
                                            
14 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [65]. 
15 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [73]. 
16 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [89] – [90], [94] and [156]. 
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22 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [132], [161], [168], [169] – [171] and 
[245]. 
23 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [124]. 
24 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [120] - [121], [152] and [170]. 
author’s view, both correct. There are however some comments which require 
further exploration. Firstly, and briefly, the reasoning of Lord Neuberger 
relating to the potential right to “make a noise” requires a small amount of 
unpacking, and he leaves open some interesting questions in his discussion of 
this issue. Secondly, the possibility of using a change in the claimant’s use of 
their land as a defence to nuisance is a potentially significant development. 
Thirdly, there is still some ambiguity in the relationship between planning 
permission and nuisance even if it is now clear that planning permission itself 
will not prevent liability in nuisance, even in relation to so-called ‘strategic’ 
development. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the shift from 
injunction to damages is highly significant for what we consider to be the 
nature of the tort of nuisance, and the relationship that it marshals between 
the holders of rights in land.  
 
Easement of noise.  
 
The first issue tackled by the court is that of the possibility of an easement of 
noise. The problems that Lord Neuberger identified in relation to an easement 
of noise, i.e. that the right is potentially vague and that many neighbours 
would be able to hear the noise (thereby resulting in multiple servient 
tenements),25 can be relatively easily overcome in theory. As Lord Neuberger 
highlights, the easement can be treated simply as the passing of sound waves 
over the servient land. 26  If imposing constraints on such a right proves 
difficult in practice (due to uncertainty over permitted levels or time of use), 
the courts are likely to develop an approach which can impose uncertainty 
onto what could potentially be a vague right.27 
 
The most significant aspect of his Lordship’s reasoning in relation to 
easements of noise is the suggestion that if this were not an easement, but 
some other kind of right, it might nevertheless be capable of being granted by 
deed.28 He states that: “I do not think that it strictly matters whether the right 
to make a noise which would otherwise be a nuisance can be an easement or 
not”.29  He does conclude however that it is capable of being an easement. He 
then proceeds: 
Subject to questions of notice and registration the benefit and burden 
of an easement run with the land, and, therefore if a right to emit noise 
which would otherwise be a nuisance is an easement, it would bind 
successors of the grantor, whereas it is a little hard to se how that 
would be so if the right were not an easement.30  
                                            
25 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [33]. 
26 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [33]. 
27 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [33]. 
28 He bases this conclusion on Pwllbach Colliery Co Ltd v Woodman [1915] AC 634. 
29 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [32]. 
30 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [34]. 
These comments are, to say the least, a little opaque. If this right were not to 
be an easement, what could it be? The only options are for a licence to have 
been implied due to the long-running course of conduct, or perhaps an equity 
arising through estoppel. Given the conceptual and practical differences 
between these different rights, it is difficult to see that the distinction does not 
matter. Nevertheless, in principle, it does seem correct to conclude that this 
right is capable of being an easement.31 The reasoning of the court that the 
passage of sound waves, akin to the passage of water or air through a channel, 
or light in relation to easements of light, a crossing of defined servient land to 
a definable extent, is convincing. It makes sense that if something as 
intangible as air can be an easement, so too can noise waves. 
 
Change of use by the claimant 
 
In discussing the ‘defence’ based on the claimant’s coming to the nuisance, 
Lord Neuberger suggests that it might be possible to rely on the claimant’s 
change of their own use of land as a defence to nuisance.32 Thus, an action 
which was not a nuisance, but which became so following the claimant’s 
action, might not attract liability.33 Partly this can be seen simply as a question 
of locality – if the defendant’s activities were lawful then they can be 
considered to be part of the character of the locality such that they are 
reasonable in that area.34 Partly also, such a defence can be seen as part of the 
process of “give and take” that their Lordships refer to.35 Neither the claimant 
nor the defendant can be allowed, through their actions, to ossify the use to 
which land can be put. Similarly, neither party should be able to demand a 
change in their neighbour’s existing use simply because they have a new 
scheme that they themselves would like to put into place. Just as the 
defendant cannot unilaterally “force” the claimant to change his use of land 
by, for example, increasing the levels of noise he emits, nor too can the 
claimant force the defendant to change his use of land by becoming unusually 
sensitive to noise through altering the activities he carries out on his own land. 
 
In practical terms however this defence (although strictly speaking ‘defence’ 
may be the wrong way to conceptualise the role that change of use might play 
here, being more a negation of liability than a defence as such) may be 
complex to administer. Small changes in the defendant’s use of their land may 
combine with small changes in the claimant’s use to result in an intolerable 
situation. Which of the two should win out in these circumstances may be 
difficult to determine. Similarly, just as a defendant’s change of use may have 
gone through the planning process, so too the claimant’s. This will raise the 
                                            
31 See also M Dixon, ‘The sound of silence’ [2014] Conv 83. 
32 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [53]. 
33 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [53]. 
34 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [55]. 
35 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [5], [55] and [179] relying on Lord 
Goff in Cambridge Water [1994] 2 AC 264, 299. 
question as to whether the fact of C’s planning permission, which will have 
taken into account D’s interest in free use of his land, amongst many other 
considerations, will impact upon the role that C’s change of use plays in a 
nuisance action. This is not to say that this defence cannot be sensibly and 
usefully integrated into the boundaries of the tort, but simply that this process 
may prove practically problematic.  
 
Furthermore, if such a defence is developed, there will need to be some 
consideration as to precisely what role it is to play. As suggested above, it is 
not clear that this is indeed a defence. Rather, if there is no breach of the 
reasonable user principle due to adverse affects coming about through a 
change in C’s, rather than D’s actions, then there is no nuisance at all. The 
language of describing this as a defence, rather than a negation of liability in 
that it means the ‘actus reus’ of nuisance is never committed, is to this extent 
misleading. If the potential for a change of use of the claimant’s land is seized 
upon by a later court, a precise understanding as to how this operates in 
theoretical terms would also be required.  
 
The relationship between planning and nuisance 
 
Linked to questions of change of use therefore, is the relationship, fractious 
and contradictory as it can appear, between planning and nuisance.36 The 
court highlights three features of the relationship between planning and 
nuisance. Firstly, it discusses the precise relevance of a planning permission 
to a nuisance action in terms of the defendant using his own planning 
permission as a defence to a nuisance action. Unsurprisingly, they conclude 
that he cannot do so.37 A public regulatory decision of this nature cannot 
simply rob a neighbouring land owner of his property rights – per Lord 
Sumption: “planning powers do not exist to enforce or override private rights 
in respect of land use”.38 Secondly, they discuss the relevance of planning 
permission to the character of the locality in general and acknowledge as such 
that a planning decision can fundamentally alter the nature of a place.39 
However, although the planning decision as a whole can be taken into 
account, those parts of the permission that constitute the permission to 
commit a nuisance must be ignored.40 Thirdly, planning permission is seen as 
relevant to the question of the appropriate remedy, in that the courts may be 
more likely to grant damages in lieu of an injunction where the defendant has 
planning permission for his activities.41  
                                            
36 M Lee, ‘Tort law and regulation: planning and nuisance’ [2011] JPL 986. 
37 In other contexts it is clear that planning permission cannot in itself override private rights. 
In relation to freehold covenants, it is clear that planning permission does not affect the 
validity of the covenant unless the developer is able to discharge the covenant through the 
powers of section 84 LPA 1925. 
38 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [156]. 
39 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [82]. 
40 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [89] – [94]. 
41 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [125]. 
 
All of these aspects of the decision make good sense, and indeed show a 
willingness to be pragmatic about the impact that public interest decisions 
have on private rights. Planning permission may also be tangentially relevant 
also as evidence as to what constitutes reasonable behaviour. According to 
Lord Sumption, a planning decision may “provide some evidence of the 
reasonableness of the particular use of the land in question”.42 What is less 
clear from the approach of the court however is exactly what they perceive to 
be the conceptual relationship between the two. This is discussed further 
below, but it seems clear that the courts have reached a sensible, practical 
solution to a difficult problem of legal policy, but ultimately without grasping 
the nature of that problem fully, they leave open the door for future problems 
in the interaction between private and regulatory law. 
 
The appropriate remedy 
 
In indicating that in future cases lower courts should be willing to grant an 
award of damages in lieu of an injunction, the Supreme Court is setting in 
place a course of action which might fundamentally change how we conceive 
of nuisance and its relationship with property rights. Admittedly, the court 
still highlights that the injunction should prima facie be the primary remedy,43 
but it is clear from the tone and extended discussion of the court that damages 
should always be considered as an option.44 This would require that Smith 
LJ’s “four-stage test” from Shelfer45 now be considered as out of date, and 
relevant only, if at all, as a general guide to assist in the application of an 
unfettered discretion. The strong presumption in favour of injunctions that 
Shelfer introduces should no longer be considered good law, even if in formal 
terms the decision is not overruled.  
 
By moving from injunction to damages, the court is recasting the role that 
nuisance plays in managing the relationship between those with rights in 
neighbouring land. It is both tempting and trite to argue that bad neighbours 
will now be able to buy their way out of breaching property rights. 46 
Undoubtedly, in a few cases, this would be the case and would also be the 
way that the defendant thought about their actions. A more nuanced view 
                                            
42 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [156]. 
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Smith LJ,  Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287, p. 322-333. 
46 See the concerns expressed by Lord Mance, Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 
WLR 433, [168]. 
however acknowledges the changing role of nuisance that the shift from 
injunction to damages reflects. Control of land use has, in recent years, shifted 
from the private to the public sphere.47 This does not mean however that 
private law does not have a critical role to play,48 not least because of the 
resources and interest of a private landowner in pursuing relatively minor 
breaches when compared with a state regulator who, under time and 
financial constraints, is likely to tackle the worst, first.49  
 
More than this however, nuisance is also what polices the interaction between 
property rights. 50  For example, freehold rights in land are, theoretically, 
unlimited in terms of use, abuse and destruction of features on that land. Of 
course in practice this is limited by environmental and planning controls, but 
in private law terms (if such a separation is possible), the right can be 
considered unlimited. But, critically, it can only be unlimited in so far as it 
comes up against the right of a neighbour who too has unlimited use of his 
land. Nuisance stands on the boundary between the two estates in land and 
regulates the extent to which – through the idea of give and take51 – one 
person can inconvenience another.  
 
The move to damages as opposed to injunction alters this, and it does so in 
two key ways. Firstly, it alters the ability of a person with rights in land to fix 
in stone their ability to use their land in a particular way. Thus if a claimant 
has been using their land for many years for a particular purpose, and a 
defendant’s actions makes that intolerable or impossible, then, when an 
injunction is issued preventing D’s actions, C can carry on as before. If 
damages are seen as the appropriate remedy, C cannot do so. The balance of 
“give and take” has been permanently altered in D’s favour. The payment of 
money does not necessarily redress the new imbalance that has arisen. 
Secondly, as recognised by Lord Neuberger, damages rather than an 
injunction mean that, in effect, the court has “sanctioned” D’s use of his land 
(even if they do not render it lawful).52 This sanctioning has a permanent 
effect on the rights that D has in his land – giving him more rights, in effect, 
than his neighbour. This is particularly the case if his nuisance action is then 
considered to form part of the locality of the neighbourhood.53 
                                            
47 P Bishop and V Jenkins, ‘Planning and nuisance: revisiting the balance of public and 
private interests in land-use development’ (2011) 23 JEL 285, 286. 
48 M Dixon, ‘The sound of silence’ [2014] Conv 83 and M Lee, ‘Nuisance and regulation in the 
Court of Appeal’ [2013] JPL 277, 283. 
49 J Steele, ‘Private law and the environment: nuisance in context’ (1995) 15 Legal Studies 236, 
241. 
50 E Lees, forthcoming Environmental Offences: Remedying Interpretive Uncertainty (Hart 
Publishing). See also J Penner, “Nuisance, the Morality of Neighbourliness, and 
Environmental Protection” in J Lowry and R Edmunds, Environmental Protection and the 
Common Law (Hart, Oxford 2000). 
51 Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264, 299, Lawrence v Fen 
Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [5] and [179]. 
52 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [69]. 
53 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [69]. 
 
If D carries on a very noisy activity on his land, which is acknowledged to be 
a nuisance, and remedied by an injunction, if D were to carry on with this, 
another neighbour could also claim in nuisance if they were affected by his 
actions. If however the court sanctions D’s actions and his act now becomes 
part of the character of the locality – or as Lord Neuberger expresses it, the 
“pattern of uses” within the locality-54 then a subsequent claimant would not 
be able to complain. Thus one claimant’s failure to obtain an injunction in a 
nuisance action would fundamentally impact upon a subsequent, different 
claimant’s ability to bring a successful nuisance action at all. 55  The bad 
defendant, in these cases, can then not only buy his way out of breaching one 
claimant’s property rights through the payment of damages, but can in fact 
buy his way out of breaching all of his neighbour’s rights. And he achieves 
this by paying only one of them. This is certainly an outcome which, at the 
very least, should not be stumbled into by focussing on remedial flexibility. 
Indeed, in circumstances where it is difficult for the court to assess the impact 
of neighbours (e.g. where such information has not been provided to the 
court), the court should, in this author’s view, guard against erring towards 
damages as a remedy since they are ill-equipped to judge the ‘public interest 
concerns’ that are intended to form part of their discretion. In cases of 
potential multiple claimants therefore, extra caution should be taken to 
prevent remedial discretion resulting in the total erosion of the property right 
of an individual not party to the instant dispute.  
 
On the other hand, there is a certain inescapable logic in the conclusion that 
when a landowner has been given planning permission for a particular 
activity, and where that planning process has taken account of the interests of 
neighbouring owners, even if it has not prioritised those interests, it seems 
odd that those neighbours who have “already had their say” can then 
override the decision of the planning authority. Perhaps, as Lee has 
convincingly argued, the relationship is too complex here to conceptualise 
with a simple planning is or is not relevant response. 56  Planning, as is 
discussed below, is best equipped to deal with problems where adequate 
public involvement and consultation is involved and where participation 
helps to predict problems before they arise. In practical terms however, some 
response does have to be given, and in this case the courts have concluded 
that planning permission does not impact upon whether or not an action that 
might be a nuisance is a nuisance. What the court does not do, however, in 
coming to this conclusion, is really grasp the nettle as to the deeper question 
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but if the now-sanctioned nuisance subsequently forms part of the character of the locality, it 
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56 M Lee, ‘Nuisance and regulation in the Court of Appeal’ [2013] JPL 277. 
of how we reconcile public and private regulation of land. Deferral to 
remedial flexibility may be practically useful, but it is not a satisfactory 
conclusion to the more theoretical debate.57 Furthermore, relying on remedies 
erodes property rights by the back door. As Dixon argues, “this is hard to 
swallow: the whole point of proprietary rights, be they of ownership or more 
limited, is that they are about land use, not land value”.58 If we do want to 
give property rights a more limited scope vis-à-vis a neighbour, this should 
be done explicitly, and not by allowing remedial choice to weaken the right. 
Indeed, the uncertainty generated by such a move would in itself have the 
potential to cause practical problems. The answer must be to clarify the role of 
nuisance and grant injunctions to prevent such nuisances. The solution must 
lie in a comprehensive understanding of how the public and private sit 
together. 
 
What is the role of nuisance? 
 
Where this takes us then is to the deeper issue as to what role exactly we see 
nuisance as playing. Per Lord Sumption, this case raises “a broader issue of 
legal policy of some importance, namely how is one to reconcile public and 
private law in the domain of land use where they occupy much the same 
space?”59, or as Lord Carnwath put it: “the present appeal as an important 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to review the proper role of this part of 
the law of nuisance in the modern world”. 60  Is nuisance a private law 
mechanism to prevent change in or escalation in use where the planning 
system does not intervene, or is it a means of balancing the property rights of 
neighbours?61 In terms of structuring the requirements and defences to the 
tort, arguably, it cannot be both.62 Unfortunately, the court in Lawrence v Fen 
Tigers never really gives us a conclusion on this broader issue.  
 
This is not simply a question as to what the relationship between nuisance 
and planning law ought to be, nor indeed what remedy for breach of private 
nuisance is appropriate, it is about the role that we conceive private property 
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59 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [155]. 
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nuisance?’ (2003) 119 LQR 298.  
rights as playing in questions of land use.63 It is not possible to consider this 
issue in detail here – the question is much vexed 64  – but it is worth 
highlighting that decisions about the shape of nuisance have inevitable 
impacts upon this role. As Lee highlights, “[t]he core difficulty in working 
through a relationship between tort and regulation is in trying to find a 
defensible path between idealised visions of what tort and what regulation 
are each trying to achieve”.65 Furthermore, we must also recognise that if we 
do not use nuisance as the means of balancing private property rights, we 
have few, if any, other options. The planning system and environmental 
regulation can deal adequately with “public interest” issues in land use, 
taking account of the nuances of the change of use threshold for the 
requirement for planning permission and having the procedural ability to 
take into account public interest factors in a more open way than a court, but 
they struggle with the more minor private grievances that a particular land 
owner suffers at the hands of another where the change of use threshold is 
not met. Furthermore, the planning permission system is dependent upon 
assessments of public interest as a whole, and is not well designed to zoom in 
upon practical impacts which emerge after a development is complete. This is 
particularly relevant where a development complies with the terms of its 
planning permission, but where minor impacts of that development were 
unforeseen by the planning authority and thus not accounted for in the 
planning decision.  
 
What we ought to guard against therefore is these more minor issues slipping 
through the gaps, such that there is no public assessment of the general good 
in allowing a particular activity to take place, notwithstanding the impact on 
private property rights, but also in there being no remedy for C in relation to 
the infringement on those rights simply because another of their neighbours 
had failed to obtain an injunction at an earlier date. It will not be possible to 
craft such a role for the tort if the tensions between it and planning and 
environmental regulation are not acknowledged.  
 
The Supreme Court has here acknowledged these tensions, and it is in Lord 
Carnwath’s judgment that we see the most nuanced treatment of this issue. 
Nevertheless, there is work to be done and this lies in the shaping of the tort 
of nuisance to correctly reflect its proper role in the light of changes to 
modern regulation. It is no longer appropriate to attempt to use nuisance as 
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the private equivalent of planning control,66 nor ought it to be seen simply as 
a way to ensure compensation to those robbed of their property rights as a 
result of a planning permission.67 Instead, we should strive to ensure that it 
has its own defined role to play as “policer” of interaction between private 
rights, a role that to date has been obscured by the infiltration of negligence-
based considerations into the shape of the tort. As Gearty argues: “This 
strategic surrender will enable nuisance to turn its undivided attention to 
what it does best, protecting occupiers against non- physical interference with 
the enjoyment of their land”.68  Private rights are, and always have been, 
constrained by public regulation and public interest. Nuisance does not need 
to take on this role as well. Instead, it should be seen as a coordination tort – 
how can we ensure one landowner can live next to others? This would require 
a fundamental recasting of nuisance, not simply a tinkering to allow it to fit 
within a framework largely governed by regulatory intervention, and such a 
recasting cannot take place if we simply place our reliance on remedial 
discretion.69  
 
There has been much written about what to do with nuisance, and what its 
role can be in the modern world, but there is little consensus over this role, 
and more importantly, recognition that the current role is blurry has not led 
to any concerted efforts on the part of the courts to define that role.70 As their 
Lordships recognised, this case provided the opportunity to provide some 
clarity. It is to be regretted that the opportunity was not fully seized. Yes, we 
now have a clearer picture of how planning permission and nuisance fit 
together, but beyond that, the picture may be different, but it is not 
necessarily more comprehensive than before. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Clarification of the role of nuisance therefore, and in particular focusing the 
tort onto the interaction between competing property rights, rather than on 
public interest, will not only allow it to sit more comfortably with modern 
regulation, it will also ensure that it has an on-gong and thriving role, and 
that this role is one which is appropriate to harnessing the resources and 
interests of private landowners.71 In order to clarify this role however we do 
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not simply need to resolve the relationship between planning, environmental 
regulation, and nuisance, but we will also need to look at precisely the sort of 
issues that nuisance tackles. Such exploration of the harms tackled by 
nuisance will require a re-evaluation of the reasonable user test and of an 
understanding of the various different types of harm that nuisance regulates. 
Lord Sumption acknowledges in this case that the entire jurisprudence on 
nuisance will need to be revisited to explain its future role.72 It is a pity 
perhaps that the Supreme Court felt unable to begin this process here. A shift 
to remedial discretion may be able to paper over our lack of commitment to 
one understanding of the role of nuisance in the short term, but it cannot get 
to the heart of the problem; the problem of the place of private law rights in a 
sphere of such regulatory complexity. 
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